A critique of the diaspora narrative and its implications for national development
By Tonderai Godknows Mapfumo
Introduction: Two Waves, One Nation
HARARE – ZIMBABWE’S migration history over the past sixty years reveals a nation forged in struggle, fractured by economic collapse, and sustained by the invisible hands of its scattered children. The two diaspora waves—Diaspora I (1960–1980) and Diaspora II (2000–2026)—represent fundamentally different epochs in the country’s journey, yet they share a common thread: Zimbabweans leaving home in search of something their homeland could not provide.
The first wave, numbering approximately 100,000 young black Zimbabweans, fled colonialism and sought military training in Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique. They returned with weapons, warfare experience, and a singular mission: liberation. Their legacy is independence itself.
The second wave, now estimated at over 900,000 to 2 million Zimbabweans abroad, has fled economic hardship, unemployment, and political uncertainty. They have scattered across South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Australia, becoming nurses, teachers, engineers, and entrepreneurs. They send home over US$2 billion annually—the second-largest source of foreign currency after exports—sustaining households, financing education, and propping up a struggling economy.
But this comparison, while useful, risks romanticising the first wave and normalising the second. The critique this submission invites is deeper: what have we lost, what have we gained, and what does this tell us about the kind of nation Zimbabwe has become?
Unique Features of the Two Diasporas
Diaspora I: The Liberation Generation
The first diaspora was ideologically driven. Young people left not to escape poverty but to confront an oppressive system. They were predominantly young, black, and male—recruits for guerrilla armies like ZANLA and ZIPRA. Their destinations were neighbouring countries, not distant continents. Their refugee status was unambiguous: they lived in military camps, trained as combatants, and were organised as a fighting force.
What they brought back was transformative: not money, but military capacity, political consciousness, and the organisational infrastructure for a revolutionary state. Their return was collective and purposeful. They came back to build a new nation, even if that nation later disappointed them.
Their unique contribution was the creation of a Zimbabwean identity rooted in sacrifice, resistance, and the dignity of self-determination. They did not send remittances; they sent themselves.
Diaspora II: The Survival Generation
The second diaspora is economically driven. People leave because the Zimbabwean economy cannot sustain them. According to the African Development Bank, Zimbabwe’s informal economy accounts for over 76% of GDP, and formal employment opportunities remain scarce. The motivation is survival, not ideology.
This diaspora is demographically broader: working-class and middle-class, black and white, young and middle-aged. It includes professionals—doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers—whose departure represents a direct transfer of skills to other economies. Between June 2023 and June 2024 alone, nearly 36,000 Zimbabweans were granted work visas to the UK, mostly as healthcare workers. In the health sector alone, over 4,000 doctors and nurses left between 2021 and 2022, three times the number in 2019.
What they bring back is financial capital: over US$2.45 billion in remittances recorded by the Reserve Bank in 2025, with the AfDB estimating as much as US$3.5 billion annually. This money now accounts for more than 8% of GDP and 16% of foreign currency earnings. It has become a lifeline for millions of households and an informal social safety net that the state cannot provide.
Their unique contribution is sustaining the economy in the absence of foreign direct investment. Remittances now rival exports as a source of foreign currency, propping up the balance of payments and cushioning the country against external shocks. Yet this is a fragile lifeline, vulnerable to anti-immigrant sentiment in host countries.
Similarities: The Continuities Beneath the Differences
Despite the differences, the two diasporas share striking similarities.
Both are responses to state failure. The first diaspora fled a colonial state that denied black Zimbabweans rights and representation. The second diaspora flees a post-colonial state that has struggled to provide economic opportunity, political stability, or institutional integrity. As one commentator observed: “It is nothing short of devastating that Zimbabwe has consistently haemorrhaged its most precious and strategic resource: its talented, skilled, and highly-educated young professionals.”
Both diasporas maintain strong emotional ties to home. Even as they build lives elsewhere, Zimbabweans abroad send money, visit family, and invest in property. Many still dream of returning—but the conditions for return remain elusive. Healthcare, in particular, has become a barrier. As one analysis noted, “People can tolerate many inconveniences… What they struggle to accept is uncertainty about healthcare for themselves, their children and their ageing parents.”
Both waves reflect a fundamental distrust of institutions. The first generation distrusted colonial institutions; the second generation distrusts post-colonial institutions—the courts, the police, the civil service, and increasingly, the electoral process. This erosion of trust is not abstract; it shapes decisions about whether to stay or leave, invest or withdraw, engage or emigrate.
The Brain Drain Effect: What Zimbabwe Has Lost
The submission’s framing of Diaspora II as a source of remittances, networks, and expertise is accurate but incomplete. It focuses on what the diaspora sends back while understating what the nation has lost.
1. Loss of Productive Capacity
Zimbabwe has exported some of its brightest minds. The tragedy, as one commentator observed, “is not merely that Zimbabwe lost people. The tragedy is that it developed and lost its productive capacity, institutional memory, innovation and confidence.”
This is not sentimentalism; it is economic reality. A nation cannot continuously export its human capital and expect economic miracles. Every doctor who leaves represents years of state investment in education, training, and healthcare infrastructure. Every engineer who departs takes with them not just skills but the ability to train others. Every teacher who emigrates weakens the next generation’s prospects.
2. The Health Sector Crisis
The health sector has been hit hardest. Zimbabwe is on the WHO’s red list of countries with dire health service shortages. The loss of 4,000 doctors and nurses in just two years has strained the public health system, forcing patients to seek care in neighbouring countries or forgo treatment altogether. The irony is painful: Zimbabwean medical professionals trained at home are now strengthening healthcare systems in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, while their homeland struggles with preventable diseases and maternal mortality.
3. The Skills Gap and Intergenerational Transfer
The departure of skilled professionals has created a widening skills gap across industries. This is not just about numbers; it is about mentorship, knowledge transfer, and the intergenerational transmission of expertise. When experienced professionals leave, they take with them decades of tacit knowledge that cannot be replaced by textbooks or online courses. The result is a “brain drain” that becomes a “skills drain,” perpetuating a cycle of underdevelopment.
4. Institutional Weakness and the Erosion of Trust
Perhaps the deepest loss is institutional trust. When professionals leave because they believe success depends more on political connections than merit, the incentive to excel diminishes. As one commentary noted, “The most talented often choose exit over engagement. This is not because they lack patriotism. Rather, they seek environments where effort and achievement are more predictably rewarded.”
What the Diaspora Has Given: Remittances as a Double-Edged Sword
The submission is correct to highlight diaspora remittances as a significant economic contribution. But this lifeline is also a symptom of deeper dysfunction.
1. Remittances as a Safety Net
Diaspora remittances have become a critical source of household income and national revenue, with inflows exceeding US$2.45 billion in 2025. The International Organisation for Migration notes that “the migrant community is a resilient one and generates a lot of income, which is sent back home… for Zimbabwe, many families are dependent on their relatives working in other countries.” This money supports household consumption, education, healthcare, and increasingly, productive investment in housing and small businesses.
2. Remittances vs. Foreign Direct Investment
What makes this significant is the comparison: remittances now far exceed foreign direct investment (FDI). While FDI has declined sharply—from US$311 million in 2013 to US$146 million in 2014—remittances have grown. This means Zimbabwe’s connection to the global economy is increasingly mediated not by corporate investment but by the personal sacrifices of its diaspora. This is a sign of resilience, but also of failure: the private sector has shown limited confidence in the country’s investment climate, so its citizens must subsidise the economy from abroad.
3. The Fragility of Remittance-Driven Growth
This reliance on remittances is inherently fragile. Anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa, the UK, and the US threatens the livelihoods of Zimbabwean migrants and the money they send home. Policy analysts warn that formalising remittance channels will be crucial for maximising their contribution to long-term growth, but this requires a regulatory environment that the Zimbabwean state has struggled to provide.
Talent Transfer and the Brain Gain Opportunity
The critique also raises the question: can this diaspora become a “brain gain” rather than a brain drain?
1. Government Initiatives
The government has launched several initiatives to harness diaspora expertise, including the Zimbabwe Global Skills Partnership Programme, which aims to transform brain drain into brain gain by aligning skills development with national priorities. Skills Audit and Development Minister Jenfan Muswere has framed this as a strategic opportunity: “How do we coordinate the skills that we have? How do we transform brain-drain into brain-gain? These are the questions that this particular programme must be able to respond to.”
A Memorandum of Understanding signed with the Zimbabwe Diaspora Nation Building Initiative aims to create a comprehensive database of skilled Zimbabweans abroad and facilitate targeted skills development initiatives. More than 1,000 Zimbabwean engineers and artisans are reportedly working abroad, representing a significant pool of expertise that the government intends to tap into.
2. The Challenge of Return
But the challenge is that return requires more than government programmes. It requires a functioning economy, predictable institutions, and a healthcare system that professionals can trust. As one analysis noted, “When hospitals struggle with shortages of staff, medicines, equipment and infrastructure, the consequences extend far beyond public health. The country sends a signal to its own citizens that basic security cannot be guaranteed.”
The current trajectory suggests that while government rhetoric has shifted toward brain gain, the underlying conditions for return—economic stability, institutional integrity, and political predictability—remain elusive.
Intergenerational Transfer: What the Young Inherit
The intergenerational dimension is perhaps the most profound critique of the submission’s comparison.
1. From Liberation to Survival
Diaspora I gave birth to a nation. Diaspora II is a product of that nation’s unfulfilled promise. The young people leaving today are not joining liberation armies; they are joining the NHS, teaching in British schools, and building careers in Silicon Valley. The shift from liberation to survival represents a fundamental change in national identity and purpose.
2. The Education Exodus
The scale of this shift is captured by the phenomenon of Zimbabwean students training abroad to avoid returning home. More than 100 Zimbabwean students in a nursing class of 140 in Zambia illustrates a new pattern: young people are not only leaving after graduation; they are leaving before they even enter the workforce. They are avoiding the “bonding” system that ties graduates to government service for low pay, and instead seeking qualifications that will make them globally mobile.
This has implications for intergenerational transfer. The knowledge and skills of the older generation are not being passed down; they are being exported. The next generation of Zimbabwean professionals is being trained in other countries’ systems, learning other countries’ standards, and building other countries’ economies. When they do return—if they return—they bring not only skills but also a detachment from the institutions and networks that make Zimbabwean society cohere.
3. The Emotional Inheritance
There is also an emotional inheritance. Children of the second diaspora grow up with stories of economic hardship, political uncertainty, and the constant struggle to leave. They inherit a sense that home is not a place of opportunity but one of escape. This is a profound shift from the first diaspora, which inherited a sense of purpose and collective destiny.
Conclusion: A Nation That Exports Its Best Minds Cannot Prosper
The comparison between Zimbabwe’s two diasporas is not merely an academic exercise. It reveals a nation in transition—from a country that fought for its freedom to a country that cannot hold on to its people.
The first diaspora returned to build a nation. The second diaspora sustains a nation from a distance, but it has not returned to build it. The difference is not just historical; it is political, economic, and deeply personal.
The critique of the original submission should be clear: Remittances are not a substitute for development. They are a symptom of the absence of development. They keep families alive, but they do not build infrastructure, create jobs, or strengthen institutions. They sustain consumption without fostering production.
Zimbabwe’s economic trajectory reflects this. While remittances have grown, formal employment has shrunk. The informal economy dominates. Investment remains scarce. The AfDB projects economic growth will slow from 7.6% in 2025 to 4.3% in 2026—a reflection of underlying fragility.
The question, then, is not whether the second diaspora has contributed to the economy. It has, and significantly. The question is whether a nation that exports its best minds can ever truly prosper. History suggests it cannot. As one commentator put it: “I am yet to see a nation that thrives when the bulk of its best minds are outside it. It can’t!”
The two diasporas are not two chapters in a completed story. They are two phases of an ongoing struggle—the struggle to build a nation that its citizens do not feel compelled to leave. Until that struggle is won, the second diaspora will continue, and Zimbabwe’s greatest export will not be gold, tobacco, or platinum. It will be its people.
Tonderai Godknows Mapfumo is the Research and Advocacy Officer for COMALISO (Coalition for Market and Liberal Solutions) in Zimbabwe and an Associate of the Free Market Foundation.
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